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Secure Multiparty Computation For Private Measurement Of Advertising Lift
ABSTRACT
Data sharing between multiple parties, e.g., advertisers and publishers, may be restricted
owing to technical limitations as well as compliance with regulation related to data privacy. This
can limit computation of certain parameters, e.g., the effectiveness of an online advertisement as
published by a publisher. This disclosure describes mechanisms to enable privacy-compliant
measurement without data sharing between multiple parties. The described techniques enable a
publisher and an advertiser to use secure multi-party Computation (MPC) to compute an
aggregate result on two joint datasets without either party revealing their private inputs. The
described techniques can be implemented using virtual private cloud infrastructure respectively
controlled by each party and configured to enable communication between the MPC programs
executed by each party.
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BACKGROUND
Data sharing between multiple parties is becoming more restricted for various reasons.
Such reasons include increased regulation, policy changes, etc. that limit data sharing, as well as
changes to technical architecture, such as browsers moving away from tracking pixels to
reporting APIs. Such limits on data sharing have an impact on certain business situations. For
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example, online advertisers and publishers (e.g., social media, image sharing apps, etc.) that
show advertisements currently share certain data with each other for the measurement of
advertising effectiveness, while still maintaining a high level of privacy controls. As additional
data privacy controls are implemented to provide privacy guarantees to users, new techniques are
needed for publishers to offer the same value proposition to advertisers that is currently
available.
DESCRIPTION
This disclosure describes mechanisms to enable privacy-compliant measurements without
data sharing between multiple parties. The described techniques enable two parties - e.g., a
publisher and an advertiser to use secure multi-party Computation (MPC) to compute an
aggregate result on two joint datasets without either party revealing their private inputs.

Fig. 1: Secure multiparty computation setup
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● Setup: Fig. 1 illustrates an example setup for secure multiparty computation. As seen in Fig.
1, the publisher and the advertiser each execute a coordinator application in their respective
data centers. Further, the publisher and the advertiser each run instances (labeled workers) in
a virtual private cloud (VPC) setup on a cloud service. The publisher and advertiser VPCs are
distinct from each other and are peered to allow network communication between the
instances. as illustrated by the arrows connecting workers. In this setup, the publisher and the
advertiser do not have any access to each other’s data.
● Input data: The advertiser’s input data for the MPC is stored on a storage bucket that is
owned and controlled by the advertiser. Only MPC workers owned by the advertiser have
access to this data. Similarly, the publisher’s data for the MPC is stored on a different storage
bucket that is owned and controlled by the publisher. Only MPC workers owned by the
publisher have access to this data. This ensures privacy-compliant multiparty computation.
● Data join: To join the data, identity mechanisms (described below) that ensure that the data
is keyed by a shared identifier across the publisher and the advertiser are utilized. The shared
identifier can be implemented in a manner such that neither party is able to determine the
presence or absence of a particular value of the shared identifier in the identity set of the
other party.
● Multi-party computation and output: The computation is performed across paired MPC
instances using secure multiparty computation techniques that enable the publisher and the
advertiser to perform linear computations on encrypted data. For example, a worker pair may
calculate aggregate summary statistics using MPC and expose the summary statistics to the
publisher and the advertiser.
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The techniques described herein can be utilized to implement a suite of measurement
products that allow advertisers to measure advertisement effectiveness in a privacy-preserving
way. One example of the measurement of advertisement effectiveness is advertising lift,
explained further below.
Privacy-compliant computation of advertising lift
Advertising lift is a measure of the causal impact of advertisements placed via a publisher
on business performance. Advertising lift enables measurement of the impact of advertisements
independent of click data, and supports measurement of advertisement performance across
multiple devices and conversion events. Briefly, advertising lift can be measured by randomly
dividing the target audience for an advertisement into test and control groups, with
advertisements being delivered only to the test group. Conversions in test and control groups are
compared to calculate advertising lift.
To implement lift measurement via MPC, the publisher provides data related to
opportunity logging and the advertiser provides data from their purchase logs. Per techniques
described herein, joint evaluation is performed to compute metrics such as incremental
conversions and sales.

https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/3665

5

: Secure Multiparty Computation For Private Measurement Of Advertis

Fig. 2: Secure multiparty computation to measure advertising lift
Fig. 2 illustrates the use of secure multiparty computation to measure advertising lift. In
this example, the private lift program is executed by a private computation service that runs on
hosts (e.g., virtual private cloud, as explained with reference to Fig. 1) that each party controls.
The program is compiled and executed to securely perform lift computation on input data from
each party, without the publisher or the advertiser revealing their respective data to each other.
As seen in Fig. 2, lift-specific components include:
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● Ad exposures that map a common identifier, e.g., a tracking pixel id, personally-identifiable
information (PII), etc. to the number of exposures, and a flag that indicates whether the
identifier was part of the test group or the control group.
● Advertiser conversations that map the common identifier to the number of conversions.
● Private lift program such as a script that performs computation of the lift. This script runs
on all hosts, e.g., operated by publisher and advertiser.
The private computation service components in Fig. 2 are:
● ID synchronization synchronizes identifiers between each party. For example, this can be
done using a shared identifier, hashed PII, or a private identifier.
● Fraud prevention detects if particular records of advertisement exposures or conversions are
likely fraudulent.
● Differential privacy enables a formal system that maintains the privacy of the external
output generated by the private computation service.
● MPC compiler compiles input programs (e.g., analytics programs) into bytecode that is
readable by the MPC VM.
● MPC VM and network synchronization executes MPC bytecode. The VM may implement
certain operations that require communication with other VM instances. For instance, in
secret-sharing based message authentication code (MAC) on arithmetic circuits, ⨦ is O(1), ×
and ÷ are O(n) where n is the number of hosts, and cmp is O(n*l) where n is the number of
hosts and l is the number of bits in the comparison.
Depending on the type of private computation to be performed, other components may be
included.
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Prior to beginning secure computation of advertising lift via multi-party computation, the
publisher and the advertiser agree on a universe of events (e.g., order identifiers, device
identifiers) that may be used in the MPC. This optimization step eliminates the need to perform
an expensive join operation with the secure calculations and reduces the overall cardinality of
rows in the MPC to conversion events. Data sets are generated by universe synchronization (Fig.
3) and utilized in the secure MPC (Fig. 4) to calculate the aggregate advertising lift result. As
illustrated in Fig. 1, the secure MPC may be performed via two virtual private cloud hosts, one
controlled by the publisher and the other by the advertiser.
Universe synchronization

Fig. 3: Universe synchronization
Fig. 3 illustrates universe synchronization that is performed prior to secure MPC to
compute advertising lift. The publisher and advertiser agree on a secret key. The publisher
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collects identifiers for delivered ads and the advertiser collects identifiers for ads that correspond
to a conversion event. Each party obtains HMAC (hash-based message authentication code)
identifiers using the shared key and the collected identifiers. The advertiser shares the HMAC
identifiers with the publisher which validates if there is a sufficient intersection between the
publisher and advertiser data sets. If sufficient intersection exists, each party constructs a
corresponding dataset. The publisher constructs an opportunity log that includes a universe
identifier, a flag that indicates whether the record is part of the test group or control group, and
timestamp information. The advertiser constructs a conversion log that includes a universe
identifier, conversion information, and conversion timestamp information.
Secure computation of advertising lift

Fig. 4: Secure computation of advertising lift
Fig. 4 illustrates secure computation of advertising lift. The publisher and the advertiser b
build respective virtual private cloud (workers, as illustrated in Fig. 1) and bridge the VPCs to
enable communication between the workers. After the setup is done, each party performs the
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MPC protocol. Using MPC, aggregate conversion values and conversion counts are obtained
(based on the datasets obtained from universe synchronization) The results are revealed
independently to the publisher and the advertiser. Each party can then independently validate the
results against prior lift results or perform other analytical actions.
CONCLUSION
Data sharing between multiple parties, e.g., advertisers and publishers, may be restricted
owing to technical limitations as well as compliance with regulation related to data privacy. This
can limit computation of certain parameters, e.g., the effectiveness of an online advertisement as
published by a publisher. This disclosure describes mechanisms to enable privacy-compliant
measurement without data sharing between multiple parties. The described techniques enable a
publisher and an advertiser to use secure multi-party Computation (MPC) to compute an
aggregate result on two joint datasets without either party revealing their private inputs. The
described techniques can be implemented using virtual private cloud infrastructure respectively
controlled by each party and configured to enable communication between the MPC programs
executed by each party.
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